By Adnan Adams Mohammed
Prominent cocoa sector stakeholders and financial analysts have cautioned political actors, commentators, and farmer associations against the partisan exploitation of state enterprise reporting.
They warn that misinterpreting complex financial data threatens to destabilize Ghana’s cocoa economy amid global market volatility.
This follows the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued a stern assessment of Ghana’s public sector, revealing that widespread political interference, governance overlaps, and politicized appointments are eroding the financial health and operational independence of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)—with the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) serving as a central focal point of concern.
In a comprehensive technical report titled “Advancing SOE Fiscal Risks Management, Financial Oversight, Governance, and Investment Implementation,” the IMF noted that political influence in executive and board appointments continues to cripple corporate governance. Despite nominal revenues across state enterprises surging from GH¢19 billion in 2015 to GH¢133 billion in 2024, overall performance remains severely constrained by foreign debt servicing, severe liquidity shortages, and unbudgeted quasi-fiscal operations.
The multilateral lender also flagged fragmented institutional oversight between the Ministry of Finance and the State Interests and Governance Authority (SIGA), citing over GH¢18.6 billion in financial management irregularities across SOEs. Notably, the report highlighted that 87 percent of contracts under COCOBOD’s cocoa roads investment portfolio were awarded directly without competitive tendering.
COCOBOD Financial Snapshots vs. Market Realities
The IMF’s structural warnings coincide with intense domestic debate sparked by SIGA’s recent report, which cited a net profit for COCOBOD as of December 2025.
Industry veterans, however, caution that using historical accounting snapshots out of context misleads the public and ignores the severe market realities that unfolded in early 2026. Addressing claims surrounding farmgate price adjustments, observers clarified that COCOBOD’s December 2025 financial status reflected an earlier, higher price regime before global market conditions forced operational shifts in February 2026.
”The claim that the price reduction happened in December 2025 is factually incorrect,” stated a senior cocoa industry stakeholder with nearly two decades of experience. “At the end of December 2025, COCOBOD was operating under the higher price regime of GHS 3,625 per bag. The adjustment came in February 2026 when global market dynamics made the previous structure unsustainable.”
Inventory Revaluation and $150M Liquidity Hit
When global cocoa prices plummeted, COCOBOD faced immediate capital constraints across local supply chains. To maintain liquidity and pay farmers promptly, approximately 51,000 tonnes of unsold cocoa inventory had to be revalued and sold at revised market rates of US4,200 per tonne, down sharply from initial projections of US7,200 per tonne.
This price differential generated a direct loss of approximately US$150 million (GH¢1.64 billion), effectively wiping out earlier operational buffers.
”When global prices dropped, holding onto 51,000 tonnes of inventory at high valuation became impossible,” explained an executive familiar with internal marketing operations. “Selling that cocoa at US4,200 instead of US7,200 was a necessary move to unlock liquidity and pay farmers, but it absorbed a massive GH¢1.64 billion hit to COCOBOD’s balance sheet.”
Exchange Rates, Farmgate Formulas, and Operational Stress
Financial stress deepened following the February 12, 2026 price adjustment.
With international cocoa trading around US$4,200 per tonne, the government implemented a revised pricing formula allocating farmers 90% of the net Free-On-Board (FOB) price. At an exchange rate of GH¢10.95 to the US dollar, this set the farmgate payout at GH¢41,392 per tonne (GH¢2,587 per bag).
However, global prices continued to fall, dropping to US$3,420 per tonne shortly after the announcement. Because the farmgate price remained fixed to protect producer incomes, COCOBOD’s payout to farmers effectively rose to 110% of the prevailing world market value.
”Within weeks of setting the GHS 2,587 price, the world price plummeted to $3,420 per tonne,” a veteran cocoa analyst explained. “At that point, COCOBOD was paying farmers 110% of the world market price. When farmer payouts exceed total market revenue, it creates an enormous deficit, leaving virtually nothing to cover Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs), haulage, evacuation, and core operations.”
Analysts added that any paper profit recorded in late 2025 was quickly absorbed by these subsequent market corrections, inventory write-downs, and farmgate price subsidies.
”Even if physical cash reserves existed from the December 2025 accounting period, expecting those funds to remain intact after absorbing a GHS 1.64 billion revaluation loss and subsidizing cocoa purchases above global market rates shows a fundamental misunderstanding of commodity finance,” the analyst noted.
A Call for Depoliticized Engagement
As the IMF urges government reforms—including stricter governance standards, streamlined oversight between SIGA and the Ministry of Finance, and hard budget constraints across state entities—local stakeholders are demanding an end to partisan commentary on commodity management.
”I have been in the cocoa industry for almost 20 years now, and this kind of politics is killing it,” stated a seasoned industry representative. “Farmer associations and industry platforms should not be weaponized for partisan politics. They are meant to serve as objective, constructive spaces for farmers to analyze market realities and engage COCOBOD meaningfully for the long-term survival of the sector.”
