News Guide Africa

Tag: Bank of Ghana (BoG)

GoldBod rejects MP’s claims of GH₵1bn overdraft as “Base Falsehood”

The Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) has issued a stinging rebuttal against allegations by Tano South MP and Deputy Ranking Member on Parliament’s Finance Committee, Dr. Gideon Boako, who alleged that the state body owes an unpaid GH₵1 billion overdraft to the Bank of Ghana (BoG).

In an official statement addressing the matter, GoldBod labeled the lawmaker’s assertions as “totally false,” “contrived,” and a deliberate effort to misinform the public regarding its financial health, demanding an immediate retraction and a full apology.

The controversy stems from comments made by Dr. Boako during a televised panel discussion on Adom TV on Monday, August 24, where he cast doubt on the financial performance of the institution’s gold acquisition operations.

“I’ve heard people say that GoldBod says they made a profit of GH¢907m, but that cannot be true because GoldBod took a GH¢1bn overdraft from the Bank of Ghana, and if that is reflected in their books, they’ll actually be in a loss,” Dr. Boako stated during the broadcast.

His comments ignited swift backlash from GoldBod leadership, who moved quickly to set the record straight regarding their credit history and operational ledger.

Through a formal press release issued by Media Relations Officer Prince Kwame Minkah, the corporate entity clarified that it operates without central bank debt instruments or external commercial liabilities.

“For the records, the GoldBod has never at any time since its establishment taken a loan, overdraft or any debt instrument from the Bank of Ghana or any financial institution whatsoever,” Minkah stated.

The statement further called into question the motives behind the claims, emphasizing that the body’s financial statements remain fully transparent and solvent.

“The claim attributed to Dr. Gideon Boako is contrived and should be treated with utmost contempt,” the release noted, adding: “We entreat the MP to unequivocally retract and apologise for putting out this falsehood.”

The clash marks the latest point of friction in an ongoing political debate over the management and auditing of the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP). GoldBod maintains that its declared GH₵907 million operating profit reflects genuine corporate performance, cautioning political actors against conflating central bank balance sheets with GoldBod’s independent financial accounting.

August 24, 2026
Understanding Shariah in Context

By Alice Boadimaa Tandoh

Shariah is one of the most misunderstood terms in Ghana’s public discourse. In simple terms, it refers to the teachings of Islam drawn from the Quran and their interpretation for daily life. In that sense, a Shariah scholar is a scholar of Islamic teachings, just as a Bible scholar is a scholar of biblical teachings.

Both Bible scholars and Shariah scholars help interpret religious texts and principles in ways that are useful to their communities. Islam, Christianity and traditional religions are all recognised and practised in Ghana, and each has scholars, leaders and teachers who provide guidance within their respective traditions.

The practice of Islam therefore includes the practice of Shariah, because Shariah sets out Islamic guidance on matters such as family life, marriage, worship, legal reasoning, commerce, service to society and devotion to God/Allah. This is comparable to the work of Bible scholars, some of whom specialise in areas such as the New Testament, the Old Testament, church history, discipleship and community service.

Similarly, Shariah scholars may specialise in Islamic law, commerce, family life, charitable giving and other areas of social and religious practice.

Religious Scholars and Professional Roles

This comparison makes one point clear: when a Bible scholar, bishop or reverend father is appointed as a board member or chairperson of a bank, the person is expected to work within banking principles, regulations and laws. The role is not to preach to members or make decisions outside the banking mandate.

The same principle applies to a Shariah scholar, sheikh or imam. When such a person serves in a national, public or institutional role, the relevant consideration should be competence, experience, integrity and adherence to the laws and rules governing that institution.

Public discussion on this matter should therefore be guided by facts and present realities. Just as some Old Testament practices would not be accepted in modern society, particularly in light of human rights principles, some aspects historically associated with Shariah law are not practised in modern secular societies. Secular states do not endorse religious excesses. For that reason, equating Shariah solely with such excesses is either misinformed, deliberately distorted or based on limited socialisation.

Non-Interest Banking and Governance

The Bank of Ghana team has done important work on Non-Interest Banking and Finance, including public education and prior stakeholder engagements. Their explanations have helped clarify that non-interest banking is still commercial banking; what differs is the model for generating revenue compared with conventional banking.

They have also explained that this form of banking requires an additional governance structure, one that demands experience, integrity, market knowledge and a sound understanding of the Bank of Ghana’s rules. The appointed members are expected to meet the fit and proper persons requirements and to demonstrate deeper interest and understanding of non-interest banking.

The appointments include both Christians and Muslims. Whether the members are reverend ministers, accountants, Bible scholars or Shariah scholars, their responsibility is to guide the development and supervision of the non-interest banking industry in line with the law, sound governance and industry standards.

Experience, Expertise and Religious Neutrality

The banking sector generally seeks experience in banking, and non-interest banking naturally requires experience in non-interest banking. Religious scholars appointed to educational, financial or other professional institutions are expected to serve according to the specific demands of the industry, not as representatives of religious advocacy.

The Bank of Ghana appointed five members to the Non-Interest Financial Advisory Council, four of whom are Ghanaians. The chairperson has been identified as highly experienced and knowledgeable in the global non-interest banking and finance industry.

Developing this market requires people who are experienced, knowledgeable and able to distinguish their religious roles from their professional responsibilities.

In making these appointments, the Bank of Ghana has been guided by local content, cross-border expertise, inclusivity, experience, readiness to learn and religious neutrality. Ayekoo, Bank of Ghana.

August 21, 2026
Miners At Breaking Point: Unleashes dual petitions over boiling crisis, locked-up funds, and ‘slave labour’

By Adnan Adams Mohammed

Tensions in Ghana’s gold-rich mining enclaves have reached a critical tipping point. The Ghana Mineworkers’ Union (GMWU) of the TUC has launched a coordinated regulatory offensive against the Bank of Ghana and the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources.

They issued an ultimatum over locked-up retirement savings and the rapid spread of precarious contract work across major sites.

In two comprehensive petitions signed by GMWU General Secretary Abdul-Moomin Gbana, the union detailed how administrative delays, unkept regulatory promises, and predatory corporate practices are pushing thousands of mineworkers into severe financial distress.

Millions in Worker Savings Trapped in Regulatory Limbo

In a petition addressed to the Governor of the Bank of Ghana, the GMWU disclosed that over GH¢380 million belonging to more than 19,000 workers remains locked in distressed Specialised Deposit-taking Institutions (SDIs), including The Seed Funds Savings & Loans Limited (TSF) and Jislah Financial Services Limited.

These funds, which encompass Provident Fund contributions, severance packages, leave savings, and personal investments managed by IGS Financial Services Limited, have been inaccessible following the central bank’s financial sector clean-up.

Despite central bank commitments dating back to 2021 and explicit mentions in multiple IMF Country Reports, no resolution has been delivered. The union emphasized that retirees, redundant workers, and widows are currently unable to fund critical healthcare, housing, or educational needs.

“Denying these workers access to their legitimate life savings undermines industrial harmony and social stability across mining communities in Ghana,” Gbana stated in the petition to the central bank. “If urgent interventions are not undertaken, there is a real risk of widespread demonstrations and strikes across the mining sector, which could adversely affect industrial relations, mineral production, government revenue, investor confidence, and the broader economy.”

Recalling previous wildcat strikes at Ghana Manganese Company, Future Global Resources, and Golden Star Wassa Mine, the GMWU demanded an immediate full refund of all trapped deposits and an urgent joint conference with the Bank of Ghana and the Ministry of Finance.

Local Content Mandates Fueling ‘Commoditised’ Labor

Simultaneously, the GMWU dispatched a petition to the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources, challenging the Minerals Commission and foreign operators over deteriorating employment conditions. The union accused Chinese-owned operations and third-party “labour brokers” of commodifying Ghanaian professionals including geologists, mining engineers, and metallurgists by placing them on short-term, low-paying contract arrangements.

The union voiced firm opposition to the Minerals Commission’s directive requiring major leaseholders including Zijin, Newmont, and AngloGold to transition their core owner-mining operations to contract mining by December 2026. According to the GMWU, the current implementation of local content regulations (L.I. 2431) has weakened worker protections while shifting profits toward third-party contractors.

The union highlighted several systemic shifts in the mining workforce:

● Shift in Employment Security: Permanent employment in the sector dropped below 10% in 2024 and has fallen under 5% in 2026, leaving over 95% of the workforce trapped in casual or fixed-term contracts.

● Wage Differentials: Workers performing core mining tasks under third-party contractors face wage reductions of 30% to 50% compared to direct owner-miner staff.

● Statutory Non-Compliance: Subcontractors frequently delay salary payments, fail to remit Tier 1 (SSNIT) and Tier 2 pension contributions, and fail to pay statutory severance benefits.

● Safety Concerns: Severe cost-cutting measures by contractors have resulted in substandard Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and underreported workplace injuries.

“Local content must create opportunities for all Ghanaians. It cannot become a vehicle for exploitation to enrich a few contractors at the expense of the workers who risk and sweat day and night in the bowls of the earth,” Gbana noted. “We cannot build a prosperous mining industry by impoverishing the very workers whose labour produces its wealth.”

Union Calls for Immediate Policy Reversal

The GMWU pointed out that despite a May 26, 2026 agreement with the Ministry to suspend forced contract-mining transitions and set up a joint Technical Committee, three months have elapsed without formal engagement.

To prevent widespread industrial action across the country’s mining hubs, the GMWU is calling for:

1. Regulatory Action: Direct intervention by the Ministry to halt casualization, fixed-term contract cycles, and exploitative outsourcing.

1. Directive Suspension: An immediate hold on all administrative directives pressuring leaseholders to shift from owner-mining to contract mining, pending a full socio-economic impact study.

1. Institutional Dialogue: The permanent establishment of a tripartite Government–Employers–Labour policy forum to safeguard worker rights in future sector policy decisions.

The union concluded that with global mineral prices at record highs, the state must ensure national value retention translates into stable, high-quality jobs rather than insecure labor.

August 21, 2026
Dr Razak Opoku’s Objective Assessment of Gold Trading Losses in Ghana

a). Specific Objectives of GoldBod:

1. To increase national foreign exchange reserves.

2. To stabilize the cedi.

3. To curb illegal gold smuggling.

b). Purported Losses at GoldBod:

$1.7 billion losses, reported by IMF.

c). Reasons for the $1.7 billion losses cited by IMF:

Losses caused by policy-related accounting cost or “quasi-fiscal” cost or trading shortfalls or transaction cost, and NOT as a result of direct cash loss or financial loss to the State.

Per page 10 of the report, “Losses accrued on gold trades are a combination of service and assay fees paid to GoldBod, discounts on gold sold to off-takers(exporters) and most importantly, exchange rate losses from the spread between the forex bureau rate paid to purchase gold and the cedi reference rate used for BoG(Bank of Ghana) accounting.”

Therefore, it is UNFAIR to soley blamed GoldBod for the $1.7 billion losses when Bank of Ghana is clearly in the picture.

d). Best Examples to Practically Explain the meaning of Policy-related Accounting Cost (“Quasi-Fiscal Cost”)

1. Government decision to spend about GH¢ 207 million on Fertilizer Subsidy, an amount which represents 50% price cut to benefit farmers.

2. Government decision to spend about GH¢ 25 billion on banking and financial sector clean-up exercise to protect the funds of depositors.

3. Government decision to offer a GH¢ 2 per litre cut (reduction) at the pumps to cushion consumers of petroleum products.

e). Is GoldBod Achieving its Specific Objective 1 (To Increase National Foreign Exchange Reserves):

Yes, but there is still room for improvements.

GoldBod has significantly contribute to the increase of the national foreign exchange reserves of Ghana, with estimated figure of about $10 billion.

Is it prudent strategy to lose $ 1.7 billion to attract a revenue of $10 billion? Yes or No answer.

Is there a better alternative gold trading policy for Ghana to raise $10 billion for the national foreign exchange reserves without the Country losing $1.7 billion as a result of policy-related accounting cost(quasi-fiscal cost)?

f). Is GoldBod Achieving its Specific Objective 2(To stabilize the Cedi):

Yes, so far there is relative stability of the cedi against the US Dollar and other major trading currencies since the introduction of the GoldBod initiatives.

However, there is still room for improvements.

We want to experience Ghana whereby $1 is equivalent to GH¢ 5, and also with the Cedi performing extremely better against other trading currencies.

g). Is GoldBod Achieving its Specific Objective 3 (To curb illegal gold smuggling):

Yes, but a lot more has to be done by GoldBod to completely eradicate gold smuggling.

According to the IMF, Ghana is estimated to have lost about $11.4 billion to gold smuggling between 2019 and 2024.

The discrepancy between gold exports reported by Ghana and imports recorded by the United Arab Emirates(UAE) exceeded $4 billion, according to the IMF Report.

$1.7 billion loss at Bank of Ghana caused by policy-related accounting cost versus $11.4 billion loss from 2019 to 2024 caused by gold smuggling, which of them should we be worried about the most as a citizens of Ghana?

h). Impact of GoldBod on the Activities of Galamsey

My major concerns are that:

1. what measures have GoldBod put in place to address galamsey activities in the country?, and also ensure that the GoldBod do not purchase gold from companies and individuals engaging in galamsey activities?

2. Is the operations of GoldBod significantly contributing to rising activities of galamsey in the Country?

3. How GoldBod has managed to reduce gold smuggling and by what estimate in terms of US Dollars?

i). Gold for Oil Programme and its losses from 2022-March 2025

The purposes of the Gold- for-Oil Programme(G4O) were:

1. To ease pressure on foreign exchange reserves.

2. Stabilize domestic fuel prices.

However, according to Bank of Ghana, the Gold-for-Oil(G4O) programme incurred financial losses of about GHS 2.43 billion, with the termination of the G4O programme in March 2025.

The net loss on gold trading for Gold-for-Reserves(G4R) and Gold-for-Oil(G4O) for 2024 was estimated to be around GHS 5.66 billion(approximately GHS 5.7 billion).

Conclusion

Bank of Ghana in trading partnership with Ghana Gold Board(GoldBod) has incurred a policy-related accounting costs of $1.7 billion according to the IMF, and this cost is not as result of directly losing cash(financial losses). However, this $1.7 billion loss is better compared to losing $11.4 billion between 2019-2024 to gold smuggling.

Both for Gold-for-Oil(G4O) and Gold-for-Reserves(G4R) incurred financial loss of GHS 5.7 billion but the question is that, were the policies of G4O and G4R able to achieved its intended purposes of currency stability, fuel prices stabilization, and prevention or reduction of gold smuggling?

As a Country, should we reverse to Gold-for-Oil(G4O) or Gold-for-Reserves(G4R) or maintain the Ghana Gold Board(GoldBod)?

…signed…

Razak Kojo Opoku(PhD)

August 20, 2026
Experts divided over GoldBod’s $1.7bn losses and forex impact

By Adnan Adams Mohammed

Ghana’s aggressive push to assert state control over the small-scale gold trade has ignited a fierce ideological divide among top economic thinkers.

At the center of the dispute is whether a reported $1.7 billion loss under the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) represents an intolerable hit to public coffers or a necessary investment to defense-fund national currency stability.

The state-led purchasing framework, introduced to channel small-scale mining output directly into official reserves, faces dual pressures: celebrated on one side as a market-shaping success that starved illicit smuggling routes, and criticized on the other as a flawed intervention that shifted massive financial burdens onto the central bank.

A Price Worth Paying for Currency Stability?

Defending GoldBod’s financial record, Dr. Emmanuel Steve Asare Manteaw, Co-Chair of the Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (GHEITI), argued that fixating on short-term balance sheet deficits misses the broader macroeconomic victory.

According to Dr. Manteaw, the $1.7 billion deficit should be understood as a operational setup cost necessary to break foreign cartels that previously controlled the local gold supply.

“We make it look like this is the first time Ghana is making losses in its gold purchase program,” Dr. Manteaw observed during an appearance on JoyNews’ PM Express. “I’ve looked at the data. In 2022, we made a loss. In 2023, 2024, and 2025, we’ve made losses all those years. Why didn’t that become a problem?”

“So if you had to incur a loss of $1.7 billion to bring in $10 billion, that for me shouldn’t be a problem… For me, they are transaction costs, and all the governments over the years have been incurring transaction costs.”

Dr. Manteaw explained that upon its inception, GoldBod was forced to buy gold at competitive forex-bureau rates to outbid foreign syndicates predominantly Chinese, Indian, and Turkish buyers who had long monopolized local supply lines by providing cash advances and machinery to small-scale miners. He maintained that the resulting foreign exchange liquidity has stabilized the cedi, lowered inflation, and built a foundation for broader economic initiatives, such as the proposed 24-hour economy.

Structural Flaws and Hidden Tax Costs

Taking a starkly different stance, economist Professor Godfred Alufar Bokpin warned against over-attributing currency performance to GoldBod, arguing that the policy’s current architecture carries severe hidden costs for Ghanaian taxpayers.

While acknowledging that GoldBod successfully squeezed gold smuggling, Prof. Bokpin insisted that broad economic stability remains the product of policy management by the Bank of Ghana and the Ministry of Finance, rather than commodity trading interventions.

“This whole domestic gold purchase arrangement for which Gold Board essentially became the face of it from 2025 has also come at a significant loss to us,” Prof. Bokpin warned. “If you adopt a holistic approach and look at the whole intervention we put in place, the losses actually exceed the $1.7 billion we are talking about here.”

Prof. Bokpin pointed to design flaws within the purchasing model and highlighted the state’s decision to scrap the 1.5% withholding tax on small-scale gold production to incentivize official declarations a move that deprived the treasury of vital revenue.

“You have all these losses sitting on the books of the Bank of Ghana. In addition to that, we had to abolish the 1.5% withholding tax,” he noted. “If you look at total gold exports from artisanal small-scale miners which exceed $10 billion the fiscal losses that could have gone to fund roads, schools, and infrastructure were given up.”

Unwinding the Deficit

Despite their conflicting interpretations of the program’s value, both analysts agreed that running billion-dollar operational gaps is unsustainable over the long term.

Prof. Bokpin noted that state authorities are already preparing an exit mechanism to restructure the program’s financial exposure.

“Government itself, together with the Gold Board and the Bank of Ghana, recognize that these losses are not sustainable going forward,” Prof. Bokpin stated. “As part of the exit plan, the government intends to reduce these losses from about 17% or 14.5% down to about 5% going forward.”

As Ghana navigates its post-recovery economic landscape, the battle over GoldBod highlights a critical trade-off: how much state revenue should be spent to secure foreign exchange reserves in a highly informal extractive economy.

August 20, 2026
BoG targets ‘Total Financial Health’ to drive SME credit beyond payments

By Adnan Adams Mohammed

The Bank of Ghana (BoG) has reiterated its commitment to driving a holistic financial inclusion agenda, declaring that true digital inclusion must move beyond mobile wallets and payments to unlock direct credit, insurance, and long-term investment for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) across the nation.

Delivering the key remarks at the third edition of the Distinguished Digital Finance Lecture, Mrs. Matilda Asante-Asiedu, Second Deputy Governor of the Bank of Ghana, outlined the central bank’s strategic direction for scaling digital finance responsibly while ensuring no economic actor is left behind.

“The next standard for inclusion in this country should be whether people can access credit, insurance, and investment on fair terms when they need to I am talking about total financial health, not simply whether they hold an account,” Mrs. Asante-Asiedu declared.

Bridging the $4.8 Billion SME Credit Gap

Addressing finance executives, fintech innovators, and industry stakeholders, the Second Deputy Governor highlighted that despite Ghana’s world-class payment interoperability infrastructure, a massive disconnect remains between digital transaction records and credit access. Ghana’s SME sector currently faces an estimated annual financing gap of nearly $4.8 billion.

“We have built extraordinary payment rails, but we have not yet built equally extraordinary credit rails,” Mrs. Asante-Asiedu noted. “An SME owner in Kumasi can receive payment for goods in three seconds through Instant Pay, but may wait three months or longer for a working-capital loan decision because that credit consideration is not built on the same digital footprint that just proved her capacity to receive payment.”

She emphasized that Ghana does not suffer from a capital shortage, but rather an architectural challenge regarding what financial institutions accept as collateral. She urged lenders to adapt to modern economic realities by reading alternative digital records such as mobile money histories, receivables, and signed contracts.

“A great deal of the value being created in Ghana today sits in contracts, in receivables, and in transaction histories rather than in fixed assets, but our systems have not yet caught up with that shift,” she explained.

A Solid Foundation for Innovation

Ghana’s digital payments landscape has experienced unprecedented growth. Through the Ghana Interbank Payment and Settlement Systems (GhIPSS), mobile money wallets, bank accounts, and card schemes operate on a fully interoperable network.

954 Million Transactions: Processed via mobile money platforms in June 2026 alone, with a total value of approximately GHS 493 billion.

84.6 Million Accounts: Total registered mobile money accounts in the country, supported by 26.4 million active accounts and over one million registered agents.

2 Million+ Users: Onboarded onto the bank-led mobile payment platform, GhanaPay, since its launch in 2022.

To preserve stability without stifling growth, the Bank of Ghana has implemented forward-looking regulatory measures:

Regulatory Sandbox Framework: Allows fintechs to test novel products from digital lending to insurtech under active central bank supervision.

Digital Credit Services Directive: Licensing regime introduced to bring short-term digital lenders out of the regulatory shadows.

Cyber and Information Security Directive (CISD 2026): Standards tailored for cloud computing, AI-driven credit scoring, and evolving cybersecurity risks.

Microfinance Sector Modernization: Transforming 147 Rural and Community Banks under the Revised Microfinance Sector Framework 2026 to deepen last-mile delivery.

Key Commitments for the Road Ahead

The central bank outlined four concrete commitments to ensure digital financial innovation yields real economic growth:

Finalize Open Banking Frameworks: Measure success by the volume of credit extended to small businesses based on transparent transaction data.

Re-evaluate Collateral Frameworks: Expand acceptable security rules so verified receivables and purchase orders can unlock working capital.

Harmonize Financial Regulation: Strengthen cross-sector coordination through the Financial Stability Council alongside the National Insurance Commission (NIC) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Democratize Cybersecurity: Provide systemic support under CISD 2026 so that smaller institutions and Community Banks can adequately withstand cyber threats.

Closing her address, Mrs. Asante-Asiedu reminded stakeholders that digital transformation must serve ordinary citizens at the grassroots level.

“Scale is as much a regulatory achievement as it is a technological one,” she stated. “Our task now is to make sure that the same phone that lets a market trader in Techiman send money in three seconds also lets her borrow against the business she has spent a decade building, on fair and competitive terms.”

August 20, 2026
Foreign investors eye Ghana’s Non-Interest Banking market as BoG clears regulatory pathway

By Adnan Adams Mohammed

Foreign institutional investors and alternative finance capital are positioning for major entry into Ghana’s financial sector following the Bank of Ghana’s (BoG) formal activation of the Non-Interest Financial Advisory Council (NIFAC).

The new regulatory framework signals a lucrative opening for global non-interest banks, private equity firms, and asset management funds seeking high-yield opportunities in West Africa’s expanding alternative finance market. By establishing clear oversight under Act 930, Ghana is clearing legal hurdles to attract long-term foreign direct investment into asset-backed infrastructure, leasing, and commercial trade projects.

Inaugurating the advisory council at the central bank headquarters, Bank of Ghana Governor Dr. Johnson Pandit Asiama highlighted that the regulatory shift provides foreign and domestic investors with a reliable framework to deploy alternative capital models alongside conventional banking.

“Non-interest finance widens that choice. It is not free finance, but a complement to conventional banking based on trade, leasing, partnerships, and asset-backed transactions,” Dr. Asiama noted.

For international financial institutions, the newly released Guideline for the Regulation and Supervision of Non-Interest Banking creates two distinct market entry strategies: foreign banks can establish fully owned non-interest subsidiaries or license specialized windows through existing Ghanaian commercial entities.

Dr. Asiama reassured investors and market participants that regulatory approval for new financial products will prioritize structural clarity, consumer confidence, and systemic stability to protect capital deployments.

“The success of this initiative will not be measured by the number of new products introduced, but by whether those products are sound, useful, and worthy of public confidence,” Dr. Asiama asserted. “Products should not be accepted merely because they carry a non-interest label. Their structure, risks, costs, and obligations must be transparent.”

Chaired by renowned regulatory expert Prof. Bashir Aliyu Umar, the cross-border council is tasked with advising the BoG while extending technical support to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the National Insurance Commission (NIC). This multi-agency alignment is expected to accelerate the issuance of alternative capital market instruments including sovereign and corporate Sukuk bonds opening direct channels for international portfolio investors seeking yield in West Africa.

August 20, 2026
Understanding Ghana’s $1.7bn Gold Trading Losses: Policy cost, not stolen cash

Following widespread public debate over the financial performance of the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) and the Bank of Ghana (BoG), economic analysts are urging citizens to distinguish between policy-related accounting adjustments and direct financial theft.

The conversation surrounding Ghana’s central bank gold purchasing initiatives reached a fever pitch following reports referencing International Monetary Fund (IMF) data, which cited approximately $1.7 billion in cumulative losses associated with state gold trading strategies.

However, closer inspection of the data reveals a far more nuanced economic picture.

Demystifying the $1.7 Billion Accounting Cost

According to page 10 of the recent IMF report, the reported $1.7 billion figure does not represent stolen funds or direct cash missing from state coffers. Instead, the loss reflects “quasi-fiscal” or policy-related accounting costs.

“Losses accrued on gold trades are a combination of service and assay fees paid to GoldBod, discounts on gold sold to off-takers, and most importantly, exchange rate losses from the spread between the forex bureau rate paid to purchase gold and the cedi reference rate used for BoG accounting,” stated policy expert Dr. Razak Kojo Opoku in an objective assessment published this week.

Dr. Opoku explained that quasi-fiscal costs are routine government trade-offs designed to achieve larger socio-economic benefits.

“Think of it like the GH¢ 207 million spent on fertilizer subsidies to offer a 50% price cut to farmers, the GH¢ 25 billion spent on the financial sector clean-up to protect depositors, or fuel tax cuts at the pump,” Dr. Opoku noted. “These are deliberate accounting decisions made to absorb shocks on behalf of the public, not money lost to corruption. It is unfair to solely blame GoldBod when the central bank’s accounting framework is central to the picture.”

Evaluating Core Objectives: Reserves, Cedi, and Smuggling

GoldBod was established with three primary mandates: boosting national foreign exchange reserves, stabilizing the cedi, and curbing illegal gold smuggling.

● Foreign Exchange Reserves: Ghana’s national reserves have surged significantly, gaining an estimated $10 billion through central bank gold accumulation programs. Analysts argue that incurring a $1.7 billion accounting cost to secure $10 billion in liquid reserve buffers represents a defensible strategic trade-off, though experts question whether a less costly alternative exists.

● Cedi Stability: The cedi has experienced relative stability against the US Dollar and other major foreign currencies since GoldBod’s interventions matured. However, stakeholders note that further structural work is needed to drive the exchange rate down toward a target of GH¢ 5 to $1.

● Curbing Smuggling: The IMF estimates that Ghana lost roughly $11.4 billion to illicit gold smuggling between 2019 and 2024, with reported Ghanaian exports and United Arab Emirates (UAE) recorded imports showing a discrepancy exceeding $4 billion.

“As Ghanaian citizens, we must ask ourselves which issue demands greater national concern: a $1.7 billion accounting cost incurred to build reserves, or the $11.4 billion lost directly to unrecorded gold smuggling over five years?” Dr. Opoku questioned.

Environmental Concerns and the Galamsey Threat

Despite progress on trade balances, major questions remain regarding GoldBod’s environmental impact. Chief among public concerns is whether GoldBod’s purchasing network inadvertently incentivizes illegal small-scale mining (galamsey).

“Critical questions must be answered by GoldBod management,” Dr. Opoku emphasized. “What stringent verification measures are in place to ensure GoldBod does not buy gold from companies or individuals engaged in galamsey? Is the expansion of official buying channels inadvertently fueling illegal mining on the ground?”

The Legacy of Gold-for-Oil (G4O)

The evaluation comes on the heels of the formal termination of the Gold-for-Oil (G4O) program in March 2025. Designed to ease forex pressure and stabilize domestic pump prices, Bank of Ghana records show G4O incurred direct financial losses of roughly GH¢ 2.43 billion over its run.

Combined, the Gold-for-Oil (G4O) and Gold-for-Reserves (G4R) initiatives registered a total net trading loss of approximately GH¢ 5.7 billion in 2024 alone.

As Ghana navigates its post-G4O landscape, policymakers face a critical decision: should the country revert to legacy mechanisms like G4O and G4R, or refine the operations of the Ghana Gold Board to eliminate accounting losses while protecting environmental standards? While the $1.7 billion IMF loss reflects the high price of currency intervention, citizens and analysts alike agree that permanent success depends on stopping galamsey at the source and closing the $11.4 billion smuggling drain for good.

August 20, 2026
Ghana’s economy navigates inflation easing and structural debt

By Adnan Adams Mohammed

Ghana’s macroeconomic landscape reflects a delicate transition from emergency fiscal stabilization to long-term structural recalibration.

Following a turbulent period marked by comprehensive sovereign debt restructurings, rapid currency depreciation, and double-digit price increases, key performance indicators suggest an economy finding its footing. However, underlying structural vulnerabilities, ranging from elevated borrowing costs to persistent energy sector liabilities, continue to temper broader growth expectations.

Data from the Bank of Ghana and the Ghana Statistical Service highlights a notable deceleration in headline inflation from historic highs. This disinflationary trend has allowed monetary authorities to transition away from aggressive monetary tightening, stabilizing the benchmark policy rate at 14.0%. Backed by strong international prices for gold, resilient cocoa receipts, and steady donor inflows under ongoing multilateral support programs, the Cedi has experienced reduced volatility compared to previous adjustment cycles, bolstering foreign exchange reserves and consumer sentiment.

Macroeconomic Indicator Previous Peak / Level Current Estimate Policy Implications

Real GDP Growth 0.5% (2020) ~4.8% – 5.0% Driven primarily by non-oil services and industrial extraction.

Monetary Policy Rate 30.0% (July 2023) 14.0% Easing liquidity constraints while maintaining an anti-inflationary bias.

Public Debt-to-GDP ~61.0% ~45.5% Reflects restructurings, though debt-service ratios remain elevated.

Current Account Deficit Surplus (~4.4% of GDP) Supported by trade surpluses in the extractive export sectors.

Expert Perspectives on the Recovery

The ongoing trajectory of the domestic economy remains a subject of active debate among monetary authorities, international development partners, and private enterprise operators:

“The current policy stance is intended to steer inflation toward the central bank’s medium-term target while allowing policymakers more time to assess incoming data and its implications for the domestic economy”, Dr. Johnson Asiama, Governor of the Bank of Ghana.

“We are moving into a phase of measured recovery, where fiscal stability and disciplined debt management take priority over rapid, unchecked expansion”, World Bank Regional Lead, Africa Economic Update.

“While easing inflation helps bring down operational input costs, high interest rates and cautious consumer spending mean small businesses still face tight liquidity”, Kwame Addo, Private Sector Analyst & Trade Consultant

“Ensuring that the macroeconomic gains filter down to the real economy requires sustained investment in domestic value-addition, particularly in agribusiness and light manufacturing”, Abena Mensah, Senior Fellow at the Center for Economic Policy

Key Growth Drivers vs. Downside Risks

● Primary Growth Drivers: The non-oil services sector led by telecommunications, financial services, and digital trade continues to serve as the chief engine of domestic output. This is complemented by strong extractive yields from high gold production and an improved balance-of-payments position that provides crucial import cover.

● Fiscal and Structural Challenges: Although the primary budget deficit has narrowed under strict expenditure controls, high legacy debt-service obligations, tight domestic credit conditions, and elevated youth unemployment continue to restrict private sector capital investment.

● Energy Sector Liabilities: Accumulating arrears within the domestic power supply chain remain a notable implicit fiscal liability, requiring continued sector reform to prevent fiscal slip-ups.

● External Volatility: External commodity price fluctuations, particularly shifting global oil and cocoa prices, continue to present vulnerability to state revenue projections and foreign exchange supply.

While macroeconomic stabilization initiatives have successfully curbed runaway inflation and reduced currency volatility, translating these top-line figures into widespread employment creation and improved living standards remains the chief hurdle for economic managers over the medium term.

August 17, 2026
GoldBod launches major supply-chain mapping initiative to trace Ghana’s gold movement

By Adnan Adams Mohammed

Ghana has set in motion an ambitious data-tracking campaign to map, compile, and analyze the flow of gold across the nation’s entire precious minerals value chain.

The sweeping effort led by the newly formed Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) is designed to give authorities full visibility over the movement of gold from mining sites to local refineries and final export destinations, effectively plugging systemic revenue leaks and shutting down illicit trade channels.

According to GoldBod Chief Executive Officer, Sammy Gyamfi, establishing a secure, data-backed map of the industry is essential to ensuring the state captures the full economic value of its natural resources.

“Effort is underway to map, compile, and analyze comprehensive data on how gold moves through Ghana’s value chain from extraction sites to local buyers, refineries, and export markets,” Gyamfi stated.

A Surge in Domestic Value Addition

The drive to map the supply chain coincides with major strides in domestic processing. GoldBod revealed that it has successfully processed 7.1 metric tonnes of domestically purchased gold through local refineries this year alone, marking a decisive structural shift away from the historical practice of exporting raw, unrefined bullion.

Highlighting the expanding capacity and reliance on domestic refining infrastructure, Gyamfi underscored the direct impact of recent structural reforms:

“7.1 metric tonnes of gold bought by GoldBod this year were refined in Ghana,” Gyamfi confirmed, pointing to local value addition as a cornerstone of the country’s economic strategy.

Transitioning Post-Central Bank Program

The national data-mapping initiative and expanded purchasing mandate mark a new phase in Ghana’s gold governance, following the sunset of earlier interventionist models.

Gyamfi clarified the evolution of the state’s purchasing mechanisms, noting that GoldBod has fully taken over the regulatory, purchasing, and export operations previously handled under temporary central bank frameworks.

“The Domestic Gold Purchase Program was a Bank of Ghana initiative; it ended in March 2026,” Gyamfi explained, noting that GoldBod now provides a permanent, centralized institutional structure to oversee the market.

A Broad Policy “Reset”

Industry analysts believe that combining rigorous supply-chain data mapping with mandatory local refining will provide the state with unprecedented visibility over its mineral wealth, dramatically reducing smuggling and under-declaration across artisanal and commercial mining sectors alike.

Attributing the current momentum to top-level policy direction, the GoldBod Chief Executive expressed optimism that the unified strategy of real-time tracking, local processing, and centralized oversight will fundamentally alter the economics of Ghana’s mining industry.

“President Mahama has reset Ghana’s gold sector,” Gyamfi remarked, emphasizing that the aggressive push for full traceability and in-country value creation will guarantee significantly higher financial returns for the nation.

August 14, 2026